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Equitable Distribution:
Virginia Code Section 20-107
IN Virginia traditional alimony was the only form of
recompense allowed to a divorced spouse until 1977.
Property was divided according to title, either his,
hers or theirs. In 1977, the legislature added the pos-
sibility of a "lump sum payment" based upon the
"property interests of the parties" after considering
"the contributions, monetary and non-monetary, of
each party to the well-being of the family," among
other factors. This language gave little guidance as to
when such an award might be appropriate or what
specific factors were to be considered.
A survey conducted by Ingrid Hillinger for the
Family Law Section of the Virginia Bar Association
in the fall of 1981 indicated that the role of§ 20-107 in
property division was unclear. Many attorneys were
still filing suits for constructive or resulting trusts.
Most believed that Virginia should adopt some form
of equitable distribution. The 1981 Virginia Legisla-
ture had also recognized the need for change and ap-
pointed a committee to study the problem. HB 691 was
the result of their study and the Virginia General As-
sembly adopted their proposal with few changes, re-
placing § 20-107 with § 20-107.1 - 20-107.3. Some may
see § 20-107.1 through § 20-107.3 as a mere extension
and outgrowth of the old § 20-107. To some extent, it
is, but domestic relations attorneys will find them-
selves in a new age.
I. § 20-107.3: Overview and
Policy Considerations
With a bold stroke of the legislative pen, the 1982
Virginia General Assembly enacted § 20-107.3, there-
by bringing to the Commonwealth a form of equitable
distribution of marital assets and a revolutionary
change in the practice of domestic relations law.
Commonly known as the "equitable distribution act,"
it will be referred to herein as EDA. § 20-107.3 allows
the court, upon decreeing a final (not an a mensa)
divorce or annulment, to enter a monetary award
"based upon the equities and the rights and interests
of each party in the marital property."1 Underlying
the enactment is the belief that a spouse should have
an interest in assets accumulated during a marriage
which are not reflected or protected by the common
law title approach to property, which focuses solely
on who holds legal title. In spirit, then, the EDA gives
courts the power to effect greater justice and fairness
between the spouses, i.e., to make the economic inci-
dents of divorce fair and equitable for husband and
wife. 2
In adopting a form of equitable distribution of mar-
ital assets, Virginia joins all other jurisdictions except
West Virginia and Mississippi.3 It might be that mis-
ery loves company. The New York equitable distribu-
tion statute has been described as "a legislative
wonder, lawyers' nightmare, court reporters' dream
and judges' ball and chain." 4 This article, drawing on
the experiences of other jurisdictions, attempts to
highlight some of the problems and pitfalls, both
theoretical and practical, which the new Act involves.
Under the EDA, the court must, if requested, deter-
mine the legal title, the ownership and value of all
real and personal property of the parties, and classify
the property as "separate" or "marital" property.'
The experiences of other jurisdictions indicate that
these determinations can be a time-consuming, ex-
pensive undertaking, and there is no reason to as-
sume that the Virginia experience will be any
different.6 First, one must identify all property in
issue. Second, the court must classify it into separate
and marital property and determine legal title to the
marital property. According to § 20-107.3(A)(1), sep-
arate property is all property of whatever kind ac-
quired before marriage, all property acquired during
the marriage by bequest, devise, descent, survivor-
ship or gift from someone other than the other spouse
and "all property acquired during the marriage in ex-
change for or from the proceeds of sale of separate
property, provided that such property acquired during
the marriage is maintained as separate property."
Marital property, on the other hand, is defined by §
20-107.3(A)(2) as "all property titled in the names of
both parties. . ." and "all other property acquired by
each party during the marriage which is not separate
property." The Act establishes a presumption that all
property acquired during the marriage is marital
property. 7
Having completed that frequently factious and le-
gally confusing determination of "separate" vs. "mar-
ital," the court must value all the marital property.
The methods of such valuation are numerous and
complex. Some suggestions regarding valuation of
certain types of property are discussed in detail,
below.8
After valuation of the marital property, the court
then considers eleven factors in determining whether
to make a monetary award and, if so, in what
amount. Note that nothing in the EDA requires the
court to enter a monetary award. The Act provides
only that "the court may grant a monetary award"
(emphasis added).9
Of the eleven factors, some are akin to support con-
sideration: the duration of the marriage, the ages and
physical and mental conditions of the parties. Others
derive from property division considerations: the con-
tributions of the parties to the acquisition, care and
maintenance of the marital property, how and when
specific items were acquired. It is indeed a potpourri,
climaxing with a catch-all, "such other factors as the
court deems necessary or appropriate to consider in
order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary
award." 0
At this point some practitioners may question the
necessity of this statutory proceeding, wondering
why a support award would not accomplish the same
objectives. However, while a support award can re-
flect a spouse's monetary and non-monetary contri-
butions to the well-being of the family and his or her
property interests, 0 the statutory limitations sur-
rounding support make it an imperfect, unreliable
vehicle to accomplish equitable distribution. Marital
fault precludes a support award. 12 The obligor spouse's
death 13 and the obligee spouse's remarriage or death 14
terminate any further right to support. Changed cir-
cumstances may justify a reduction in its amount. 15
In short, the uncertain, precarious nature of a support
award will not insure that a spouse will receive his or
her equitable share of the accumulated marital as-
sets.16
A monetary award, as a form of property settle-
ment, does not share that uncertainty. By definition,
it is fixed, non-modifiable and therefore impervious to
changed circumstances.17 Installment payments do
not alter its non-modifiable nature.'" Fault will not
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bar an EDA award, and the only fault which the court
is directed to consider is the fault which led to the
breakdown of the marital relationship. Post-separa-
tion adultery apparently would not even be "consi-
dered."' 9
Under the EDA, a court may recognize a spouse's
equitable, as well as legal, interest in marital assets.
However, it may do so only by means of a monetary
award; it cannot affect a spouse's legal interest in
property. It cannot distribute or divide assets unless
they are jointly owned by the spouses, in which case,
the court may order partition in the divorce decree.
20
Virginia and Maryland are the only equitable distri-
bution states which prohibit actual court distribution
of property in a divorce proceeding. 21 In actual prac-
tice, however, the difference between the Maryland-
Virginia monetary approach and that of other juris-
dictions may be more apparent than real. The court
may approve a proposed transfer of property from one
spouse to another in satisfaction of a monetary
award. 2' The EDA, albeit indirectly, countenances
the distribution of property.
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Finally, one of the results of this Act may be to
encourage spouses to execute a reasonable separation
agreement. To that end, the EDA provides that the
powers granted to the court under § 20-107.3 are not to
be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification
or incorporation of the parties' separation agree-
ment.
23
II. Practice and Procedure under the EDA
Virginia has no "local rules" but divorce procedures
are vastly different throughout the state. Attorneys
should check with each court in which they practice
to determine if the EDA will cause any changes in
local practices. Some of the courts may change their
procedure because of the additional duties imposed on
the court by the Act. Some may refer all partition
matters to Commissioners since they are routinely
handled this way in many courts, or may wish to refer
to Commissioners the fact-finding of legal title, owner-
ship and valuation of all property of the parties and
recommendations as to the characterization of the
property as either "separate" or "marital." However,
courts are aware of the enormous expense of Commis-
sioner's hearings and may be reluctant to expand the
Commissioner's role. Expenses for appraisers for real
and personal property, actuaries to prove the value of
pensions, annuities and life insurance policies, econ-
omists to prove the value of the housewife's services,
and accountants to trace funds and proceeds of "sep-
arate" property or their commingling with "marital"
property will greatly increase the expense of the aver-
age divorce.
Since equitable distribution is not automatic, it
must be requested by the motion of either party.
Ideally it should be part of the prayer for relief in the
original Bill of Complaint or Cross-Bill. The Act does
not indicate whether or not partition of jointly titled
property must be requested or may be ordered by the
court on its own motion. The safer course is to request
it in the prayer for relief.
Every effort should be made to discover the assets
of both parties before filing the suit. Many wives are
unaware of all the "marital" assets, including those
that are jointly titled. § 20-107.3(B) makes it clear that
separately titled property may be disposed of during
coverture without interference from the other spouse.
Filing an immediate request for a § 20-103 restraining
order with the Bill of Complaint may be necessary to
prevent the other spouse from disposing of "marital"
property which is separately titled. The order may
also direct the filing of a lis pendens, or the attorney
may attempt to do this on his or her own, although it
is not specifically authorized by the statute.
Discovery will be an absolute necessity, particu-
larly if you are interested in discovering the source of
funds used to purchase or improve various pieces of
property or to discover assets that you may not have
known existed. After discovery, your next step will be
the divorce hearing itself, since the "circumstances
and factors which contributed to the dissolution of the
marriage, specifically including any grounds for di-
vorce,"23 are factors to be considered by the court in
determining the equitable distribution. After "fault"
has been determined, you have reached the final
hearing.
If you are attempting to claim any property as "sep-
arate," your client has the burden of proof, since the
Act states that all property acquired during the course
of the marriage is presumed to be "marital" property.
Since jointly titled property is "marital, ' ' 24 the asset
must be titled separately. In a long marriage, it may
be hard to prove the source of funds used to purchase
an asset, resulting in almost all assets being classi-
fied as "marital." Absent proof of one of the follow-
ing, the property will be classified as "marital":
1. property protected by an ante-nuptial agree-
ment;2
5
2. property protected by a valid separation and
property settlement agreement pursuant to § 20-109 or
§ 20-109.1; 26
3. property acquired before the marriage by either
party (the statute is silent on property acquired sep-
arately but in contemplation of the marriage);27
4. property acquired during the marriage by be-
quest, devise, descent, survivorship or gift from a
source other than the spouse (although the Act is si-
lent on gifts or inheritance as a result of agreement-
for instance, an agreement by a couple to take care of
an elderly parent in return for an inheritance-some
jurisdictions have carved out an exception for this
type of gift or inheritance; 28
5. property acquired during the marriage in ex-
change for, or proceeds of, the sale of "separate"
property, provided that it is "maintained" as separate
property-commingling spells the termination of "sep-
arate" property;2 9
6. income received from, and the increase in value
of, separate property during the marriage.
3
Suits for resulting or constructive trusts outside of
the divorce suit will not be permitted once the court
has "considered" the property for purposes of equita-
ble distribution. If assets are hidden and the court
does not "consider" them, no remedy is explicitly pro-
vided.
After hearing all the evidence, the court is directed
to make the following findings of fact:
(a) legal title as between the parties;
(b) ownership and value of all real and personal
property of the parties; and
(c) what is "separate" and what is "marital" prop-
erty.31
The Act does not make clear whether the property of
the parties is valued and considered at the time of the
final decree, at the time of the separation or at the
time of the filing of the suit. By implication, the first
sentence of § 20-107.3 indicates that the proper point
in time is the date of the final decree. Then the court
looks at the eleven factors set out in § 20-107.3(E)(1)-
(11) and determines whether or not an award should
be made and, if so, how much of an award.
The court may also partition jointly-titled property.
The Act does not indicate that the procedure would be
different from that set forth in § 8.01-81 et seq. How-
ever, because of the nature of partition suits, partition
would take some time to complete. The final decree
could conceivably order a division of real estate or
personalty in kind. If the property was not partition-
able in kind and a sale was necessary, the final decree
would only be able to order the division of proceeds as
directed by the court. If a sale were ordered, it would
David A. Glazer is a consultant specializing in
legal research, writing, and analysis. He re-
ceived his B.A. degree from State University
College in Oneonta, New York and his J.D. from
American University. He is a member of the
Virginia State Bar, the Association of Trial Law-
yers of America, and the adjunct faculty of
Georgetown University.
be impossible to include as part of the monetary
award since there would be no certainty as to the pro-
ceeds of sale (which could occur months later). The
court might choose to order a percentage division of
the proceeds, but the Act requires a sum certain.
§ 20-107.1 directs the court to consider "the provi-
sions made with regard to the marital property under
§ 20-107.3" before making an alimony or child support
award.3 2 In many circumstances, the monetary award
might dispose of the need for support, the award pro-
viding sufficient means for economic self-sufficiency.
If the spouses have few accumulated assets, it might
not. In such cases, the court can use the support pro-
visions to provide for need or to compensate for con-
tributions made to the well-being of the family.
1II. Important EDA Factors
It will be two to three years before any appeals pur-
suant to the EDA reach the Virginia Supreme Court.
Therefore, the practitioner will have to rely on deci-
sions from other states and the local rulings as they
develop in each jurisdiction when arguing factors
(E)(1)-(11) to the court. There is not enough space to
cover the leading cases in detail, but the cases cited
will give the practitioner a starting point. It is impor-
tant that counsel read a particular state's equitable
distribution statute before relying on that state's
cases.
A. Presumption of Equal Division
The Act provides for equitable distribution, not
equal distribution. Some equitable distribution stat-
utes require the distribution to be equal unless that
would not be equitable, 33 but there is no such pre-
sumption in our statute. Some courts have come to the
conclusion that the starting point must be a 50-50 divi-
sion even when their statute does not contain this
presumption. The relationship of a husband and wife
is viewed as a partnership in which each contributes
equally. For hundreds of years, all property owned as
tenants by the entirety or joint tenants was deemed to
belong one-half to each spouse and the 50-50 pre-
sumption merely continues this view.34 Other courts
have rejected this view. The New Jersey Supreme
Court has held that a trial court cannot start with a
50-50 presumption. Each case must be examined in-
dividually. 35 In agreement with this view, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court has held that flexibility is
required because of the "endless variety of human sit-
uations." 36
B. Division of Joint Property
The Maryland equitable distribution statute pro-
vides that the court may settle any dispute between
the spouses with respect to ownership of real property
and prohibits the court from transferring ownership
of property from one spouse to the other: 7 (similar to
provisions contained in our EDA). 18 In Ward:3 9 a
Maryland trial court awarded the husband all the in-
terest in a residence held as tenants by the entirety,
except for $10,000 which was deemed to be the wife's
share. There was no dispute over the ownership of the
property since the parties admitted that it was held as
tenants by the entireties, each with a one-half, undi-
vided interest in the property. The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals held that the award was improper
because the trial court was attempting to transfer a
portion of the wife's one-half share to the husband
and was a violation of the statute prohibiting transfer
of ownership. The Court of Special Appeals criticized
the trial court's ruling since no specific monetary
award was made and there was nothing in the record
to show whether or not the order was based upon
statutorily enumerated factors. It is unclear whether
or not the trial court could have awarded the husband
a sum certain equal to the equity in the residence less
$10,000 if the award had been based upon statutorily
enumerated factors.
C. Professional and Business Licenses,
Partnership Interests
Some statutes specifically exclude professional li-
censes or degrees from property subject to equitable
distribution; 40 the EDA does not. Most jurisdictions
have ruled that a spouse who helped put the other
through professional school and/or contributed to the
success of a professional practice is entitled to a spe-
cial consideration in the division of "marital" prop-
erty.4" If spouses are divorced immediately after
graduation from a professional school or there are no
"marital" assets at the time of divorce, the courts rec-
ognize the unfairness of the results. This view is best
expressed by the dissent in the Colorado case of In re
Marriage of Graham: "in cases such as this, equity
demands that courts seek extraordinary remedies to
prevent extraordinary injustice. If the parties had
remained married long enough after the husband had
completed his post-graduate education so that they
could have accumulated substantial property, there
would have been no problem.... Unquestionably the
law, in other contexts, recognizes future earning ca-
pacity as an asset whose wrongful deprivation is
compensable. Thus, one who tortiously destroys or
impairs another's future earning capacity must pay
as damages the amount the injured party has lost in
anticipated future earnings .... The day before the
divorce the wife had a legally recognized interest in
her husband's earning capacity." 2
Some courts have carved out a special exception for
this situation. In Horstman,43 the Iowa Supreme
Court held that a law degree was not property, but the
increase in earning potential was. The court added
the wife's financial contributions to household living
expenses and subtracted the husband's contributions
during the time he was attending law school and
awarded the wife the difference-$18,000. The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals also has carved out an excep-
tion from their rule that professional licenses are not
normally considered "property" subject to equitable
distribution. Inman4" involved a wife who helped her
husband through dental school and helped him build
a dental practice. The parties had a net worth of $0
after considering the liabilities at the time of divorce.
The Kentucky court decided that it would be inequit-
able not to award the wife a lump sum in recognition
of her efforts. It determined the amount of the award
by adding "the amount spent for direct support and
school expenses during the period of education, plus
reasonable interest and adjustments for inflation
... Oklahoma also subscribed to this view in the
Hubbard case. 46 Mrs. Hubbard spent 12 years work-
ing and putting her husband through medical school.
The court felt that she had an equitable claim for
unjust enrichment and limited their holding to the
facts of the case.
Most courts that hold a professional license or de-
gree is not property, have ruled that alimony is the
spouse's remedy. If the spouse does not qualify for
alimony according to state law (as in the Graham
case), the spouse has no remedy. In Hill,17 the wife
was enrolled in dental school at the time of the di-
vorce and had made the larger financial contribution
to the husband's expense while he was in dental
school. The New Jersey Appellate Division ruled that
the wife was entitled to rehabilitative alimony to al-
low her to finish her education. On the other hand, in
Mahoney,48 the same court denied even rehabilitative
alimony to the wife since the court found both parties
had advanced degrees and approximately equal earn-
ing capacity. In Virginia, alimony has been the tradi-
tional remedy for a spouse in the "putting hubby
through" situation. Yet § 20-107.1 still bars alimony if
the wife is found to be at "fault."
Most states seem to agree that a spouse's interest in
a business, partnership, or corporation is marital
property to the extent acquired during the marriage.
With medical, dental and law practices, a large por-
tion of the value of the business is goodwill. Califor-
nia and many other community property states have
long recognized the value of goodwill although it is
difficult to determine. 49 Some cases have used opinion
evidence,50 others "capitalization of excess earnings"
for determining the value of goodwill in a profes-
sional corporation,5 or the value of goodwill has been
determined by an arm's length agreement between
partners the husband was allowing into his profes-
sional practice. 52
New York is an equitable distribution state and has
recognized goodwill as an asset, approving the "capi-
talization of excess earnings" approach to determine
value. In Nehorayoff,53 the court cited IRS Rev. Rul-
ing 59-60 as a guide in determining the value of
goodwill for a professional corporation.5 4 Since the
net assets of a professional practice are not usually
appropriate for valuing the business, nor are divi-
dends paid an appropriate method, the formula used
by the court was: the amount actually paid to the
husband - a reasonable compensation for the services
rendered = the earnings of the corporation. Then the
"capitalization of earnings or capitalization of good-
will equalled the net annual earnings." The Califor-
nia case of Lopez 55 contained a formula for valuing a
law practice: goodwill + fixed assets (cash, furniture,
equipment, supplies and law library) + other assets
(accounts receivable, costs advanced with adjust-
ments for collectibility) + work in progress + work
completed but not yet billed + husband's capital ac-
count - liabilities. In Stern,56 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court looked to the husband's law firm's
partnership agreement to determine its value and cal-
culated it as the amount the husband's estate would
have received on his death + the husband's capital
account. The court suggested an alternate method of
valuation: (value of partners' capital accounts + ac-
counts receivable + value of work in progress + ap-
preciation of tangible personal property over the book
value + goodwill - liabilities) x the husband's share of
the partnership. The California case of Fonstein57
used a similar method of valuation. It looked to the
partnership agreement and computed the husband's
interest in the partnership as equal to his payment
due upon his withdrawal or death. Both Stern and
Fonstein held that it was error to reduce the value of
the husband's interest by the tax consequences to the
husband should he receive the payment from the
firm. The court was to value his interest for purposes
of determining an equitable distribution.
D. Tax Consequences of EDA
The tax consequences of a transfer of appreciated
assets in the name of one spouse to the other spouse in
satisfaction of an equitable distribution award could
be harsh. Since our EDA does not mandate an award
and does not transfer or divide separately-titled "mar-
ital" property, it would probably result in capital
gains to the transferor spouse.58
E. Pensions and Retirement Plans
Most equitable distribution and community prop-
erty states recognize pension and retirement plans as
property. Some make a distinction between vested
and nonvested, matured or unmatured. However, that
is not an issue in Virginia, since § 20-107.3(E)(8) al-
lows vested and nonvested rights to be considered.
Courts have adopted different methods for valuing
this type of property. The New Jersey Appellate Divi-
sion in DiPietro59 adopted the "total offset method"
which assumes "that over the long run, the rate of
inflation runs parallel with and equal to the rate of
interest and thereby precludes the necessity of dis-
counting to arrive at present value." The court noted
that Pennsylvania and Alaska had approved this
method in other cases.6 0 The Maryland Supreme
Court in Deering6' suggested some ways of arriving
at a value for an unmatured pension or retirement
plan:
1. add the amount of the employee's contributions
to the fund plus interest and award the other spouse
an equitable share;
2. figure the present value of the retirement bene-
fits when they vest-benefits payable in the future
would be discounted for interest, mortality and vest-
ing;
3. determine a fixed percentage for the non-em-
ployee spouse to receive from the employee spouse's
retirement plan when the monies are actually re-
ceived.
Deering method #3 would seem simplest and is
suggested by the language of § 20-107.3(G), except
that the "present value" of such benefits is to be con-
sidered pursuant to § 20-107.3(E)(8). Thus, a court in
Virginia may have to go through a double calcula-
tion-figuring the present value, then figuring in
what monthly amount the award is to be paid if and
when the retirement payments are received. However,
the court is directed to make "a monetary award,
payable either in a lump sum or over a period of time
in fixed amounts. '62 This forces the court to make
presumptions as to the rate of inflation when ordering
a specific dollar amount to be paid. If a spouse dies
after receiving some retirement payments, but not all
of the payments necessary to pay off the monetary
award, a fixed, definite award is changed into a con-
tingent award.
After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
McCarty,63 military retirement pay (whether matured
or not) could not be "considered" under § 20-107.3)
(E)(8). Prior to McCarty, California community prop-
erty law allowed the division of military retirement
pay upon divorce.6 4 McCarty held that California
community property laws were preempted by the fed-
eral scheme of military retirement benefits. After the
McCarty decision, the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari in Russell 65 and Cose.6 6 Both these cases denied
consideration of military retirement benefits in equit-
able distribution states. The Supreme Court also va-
cated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana
in Miller67 when the Montana court held that military
retirement pay was subject to equitable distribution.
Thus, it appeared that equitable distribution states
are also precluded from considering military retire-
ment pay as part of the marital property distribution
scheme.
The McCarty decision followed the Supreme Court's
earlier Hisquierdo decision, 68 which held that railroad
retirement pay is also not divisible upon divorce. His-
quierdo supposedly carved out a narrow exception
based upon an overriding federal interest. Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in McCarty raised fears about
where the Supreme Court was headed next. "Ques-
tions concerning the appropriate disposition of prop-
erty upon the dissolution of marriage, therefore, such
as the question in this case, are particularly within
the control of the states, and the authority of the
states should not be displaced except pursuant to the
clearest direction from Congress ... Today's decision
is not simply a logical extension of prior precedent."6 9
What other retirement plans would the Supreme
Court decide to preempt? Private pensions and re-
tirement plans regulated by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act? 70 Civil Service pensions?
Then Congress acted to show a clear legislative in-
tent. On September 9, 1982, President Reagan signed
HR 6030 into law. As we go to press, a copy of the act
was not available, but some of its provisions are
known. The act effectively reverses the McCarty deci-
sion by allowing state law to determine whether or
not military retirement pay is "property."
However, the act adds restrictive requirements:
1. The state court may exercise this authority only
if it has jurisdiction over the service member:
a. by reason of the member's residence in the
state other than because of military orders,
b. the member's domicile is in the state, or
c. the member consents.
2. The Court order must certify that the rights of
the service member under the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act were complied with.
The new law is helpful in many respects, but it still
leaves McCarty in place for contested divorces in
which the service member's domicile is elsewhere and
he or she resides in this state only because he or she is
stationed here. If it is impossible for a spouse to meet
the residence and domicile requirements of the mem-
ber's state of domicile, the spouse may be out of luck
unless the state of domicile authorizes an equitable
distribution or community property division after di-
vorce in another state.
IV. Suggestions for Legislative
Change to the EDA
Total reliance on a monetary award to reflect a
spouse's equitable interest in marital property has
one distinct disadvantage: it may overcompensate or
undercompensate the receiver spouse. Of necesssity,
the monetary award must be based on the value of the
property at the time of the decree. After the decree,
that value may change substantially. The risk of loss
(decrease in the value of the property) and the possi-
bility of gain (increase in the value of the property)
rest entirely with the legal title holder. Other jurisdic-
tions avoid this problem because actual distribution
of the assets distributes the risk of gain or loss. On the
other hand, the monetary award approach avoids the
hardship entailed in "distributing" an asset that is
distinctly nondistributable, such as the family farm,
or an on-going business. 1
Equitable distribution, if ordered to be paid in in-
stallments, still may not give 100 percent protection
to a spouse. As a property settlement, it is subject to
discharge in bankruptcy.7 2 Also, some obligor spouses
have a habit of disappearing into the night, never to
be found again, making enforcement impossible. A
lump sum award avoids these problems.
The EDA's definitions of "marital" and "separate"
property pose several different questions. The Act
does not, for example, define how one "maintains"
property as separate property. Is title conclusive or
will use be influential? Assume H buys a home before
marriage. It is separate property because it was ac-
quired before marriage. After marriage, title remain-
ing only in H's name, W pays the mortgage or
substantially renovates it, increasing its value signif-
icantly. According to the definition, the house is sep-
arate property and unavailable as a basis for a mone-
tary award. That potential unfairness prompted New
York to exclude from separate property appreciation
in separate property due to the contribution or efforts
of the other spouse.73 Although it involves compli-
cated tracing problems, the New York approach
seems fairer.
Until the moment before the divorce decree, all
property acquired by either party will be deemed to be
marital property. This would include property ac-
quired after the parties' separation, and regardless of
the length of their separation. The definition of mari-
tal property should have an earlier concluding point
than the divorce decree. Property acquired after sepa-
ration, or an a mensa decree or the institution of di-
vorce proceedings should be deemed separate prop-
erty.
The EDA should require the court to state the rea-
soning for its monetary award determination7 4 Such
a requirement would limit the potential for arbitrary
judicial action and make appellate review possible.
The EDA fails to provide the court with jurisdiction
to enter a monetary award after an ex parte divorce
decree in another state. Many states allow such an
award, but Virginia courts have jurisdiction to con-
sider a monetary award only upon annulment or di-
vorce. An ex parte decree from another state would
preclude the court from assuming that jurisdiction.
For purposes of clarity, separate property should be
defined to include "property described as separate
property by written agreement of the parties. .. 75
This would reinforce the thought contained in § 20-
107.3(H) that valid ante-nuptial agreements are en-
forceable.
Although not specifically mentioned in the EDA,
the degree to which a spouse dissipates assets should
be considered. Some statutes76 specifically mention it
and certainly it should be a factor in determining a
spouse's equitable interest in the existing assets.
V. Conclusion
As the courts begin to apply the EDA, practitioners
will learn more about it. Inevitably, the legislature
will make modifications to fine tune the Act. For all
its complexity and difficulties, the EDA should ensure
a fairer distribution of assets upon divorce.
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